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COMMISSION I 
1.  "Parallel  with  the  applications  for  membership,  and  in  most  cases 
because  of  them,  several  European  ~ountries, in  particular some members  of 
EFTA,  have  made  it  known  that  they  wish  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
Community with a view to establishing special relations.  Thus, the possibility 
of  enlargement  means  that the  Community  must  tackle  the  problem  of  the 
economic organization of a large part of Europe." 
It was in these terms in its Opinion rendered on 1 October 1969 (point 34) 
that  the  Commission  drew  the  Council's  attention  to  the  concrete  and 
immediate  problem  arising  in  connection  with  the  Community's  possible 
enlargement out of the fact that three of the four applicant countries belonged 
to the European Free Trade Association set up by the Stockholm Convention.1 
The applicant countries will, of course, have to withdraw from this Convention 
as  soon as possible.  It would therefore appear necessary to know what would 
happen  to  the  free  trade  arrangements  which  at  present  exist  between  the 
applicant  countries  and  their  EFTA  partners. 
The following  table,  covering  the  year  1969,  shows  the  real  econom1c 
importance of this  problem. 
Expressed as a percentage  Expressed as a percentage 
of GNP  of total exports 
Countries  . 
Total  Exports to  Exports  Exports to  Exports to 
the enlarged  to the  the applicant  the enlarged  exports  Community  Six  countries  Community 
Austria  19.4  9.8  41.4  9.1  50.5 
Finland  21.7  10.7  24.0  25.5  49.5 
Iceland  27.4  10.5  15.9  22.4  38.3 
Portugal  17.0  7.3  17.9  25.2  43.1 
Sweden  22.2  13.6  27.8  33.3  61.1 
Switzerland  25.0  12.0  37.4  10.3  47.7 
1  Signed  on  4 January 1960  by  Austria,  Denmark,  Norway,  Portugal,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
and the United  Kingdom;  Finland is  associated with EFT  A by  virtue of  an  agreement signed 
on 27 March 1961; finally, Iceland acceded to  the Stockholm Convention on 4 December 1969. 
s  3'  1971  z- 3 2.  The  establishment  of  close  relations  based  on  the  free  movement  of 
goods with European countries which did not belong to  the  Community was 
a  difficult  problem  at  the  time  when  the  Rome  Treaties  came  into  force. 
In  an  attempt  to  find  a  solution  discussions  and  negotiations  were  held 
during  the  period  1956-1958  within  the  framework  of  OECD,  with  a  view 
to setting  up  a  large  European free  trade  area.  Two irreconcilable  concepts 
clashed on this occasion. 
As far as the countries which were not members of the Community were 
concerned, there should be  no difference  in  customs  tariff treatment between 
the  Six  and  their  partners,  since  any  measure  which  resulted  in  differences 
of this kind was considered "discrimination" and condemned from the outset. 
At the same time,  these  countries  took the  view  that it was  not essential for 
free  trade  to  be  accompanied  by  harmonization  of  domestic  and  external 
economic policies  as  required  by  the  Rome Treaties. 
The EEC Member States considered that such harmonization was essential 
not only  from the technical standpoint, but also  in order to stress  the nature 
of their venture,  which looked forward  to  an  ever  Increasing  degree  of  inte-
gration  at  a  later  stage.  Furthermore,  these  countries  took  the  view  that, 
by creating their Community,  by  agreeing to make certain  sacrifices  to assist 
.its  formation,  and by  accepting  new constraints  and  specific  obligations,  they 
had :,uilt up between them a solidarity which entitled them to treat each other 
differently  from  the  way  they  treated  non-member  countries.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  they  acknowledged  that if  their venture  created  problems  for 
any  of  their  partners,  they  would  be  prepared  to  seek  together  with  them 
practical  solutions  involving  cooperation. 
A further difficulty  arose from  the fact  that the problem  of close  asso-
ciation between the other European countries  and  the  Community came  at  a 
very  early  stage  in  the .latter's  history,  the  Community  being  in  its  infancy. 
The transitional period had only just begun.  The common external tariff,  on 
which the Community bases  its  trade relations, had not yet  been fully  estab-
lished,  and it was to be put into effect over a period of more than ten years. 
It was  therefore  more  difficult  for  the  Community  to  take  action  than  if  it 
had already had years  of  Community life  behind it.  It was  also  difficult not 
to be  concerned with something that might  affect  its  development  adversely, 
or even  jeopardize its  very  existence. 
3.  Since  1959  the  Community  has  not been  called  upon to  take decisions 
involving the simultaneous establishment of close  relations with several  Euro-
pean  countries  whose  economic  structures  are  comparable  to  its  own.  The 
prospect  of enlargement  has  raised  this  problem  once  again. 
The Heads of State  and  Government of  the  EEC  Member States  made 
the following statement at the Hague Conference,  concerning those European 
States which had not applied for membership, in point 4 of  the Communique: 
4  s.  3- 1971 "The entry of other countries of this continent into the Communities-in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaties  of  Rome-would 
undoubtedly  help  the  Communities  to  grow  to  dimensions  still  more 
in conformity with the  present state of economy  and technology.  The 
creation of special links with other European States which have expressed 
a  desire  to  that effect  would  also  contribute to this  end." 
They further stated in  point 14  of  the  Communique: 
"As soon as  negotiations with the applicant countries have been opened, 
discussions  on their position in relation to  the EEC will be started with 
such  other EFTA  countries  as  may  request  them."  · 
At  its  session  on  8  December  1969,  the  Council  recognized  the  need 
to  adopt a  common  position  in  order  to  implement  point 14  of  the  Hague 
Communique. 
This common standpoint was adopted by  the Council on 8/9 June 1970. 
It was  first  of  all  explained  to  the. applicant  countries  on  30  June  1970,  in 
the  following  terms: 
"The  Community  is  prepared  to  open  discussions  with  the  European 
States  which  are  members  of  EFT  A  but have  not applied  for  member-
ship  of  the  Community  on  the  subject  of  possible  solutions  to  the 
problems  arising  from  enlargement,  thus  to  enable  these  States  to 
contribute  to  the  construction  of  Europe." 
Later,  at the  ministerial  meetings  with each  of the countries  concerned, 
on  10  and  24  November  1970,  the  President  of  the. Council  expressed  the 
Community's point of view  in the following words: 
"We are  of course  aware that the  enlargement  of  the  Community will 
have  repercussions  for  those  EFT  A  member  countries  which  have  not 
applied to join. 
"This is  why point 14 of the Hague Communique stipulates that as  soon 
as  negotiations  with  the  candidate  countries  begin,  discussions  will  be 
held,  where  requested,  with  other  EFT  A  countries  concerning  their 
position vis-a-vis  the Community. 
"The  Community believes  that these  discussions  should  cover  possible 
solutions  to  the  problems  which  enlargement  would  involve  for  the 
other European  States  which  have  not applied  for  membership.  The 
Community also  believes  that these  problems  should  be  solved  in  such 
a way so  as not to interfere with the enlarged Community's autonomous 
decision-making  powers,  its  common  policies,  its  smooth  functioning 
and  its  prospects  for  further  development.  Finally,  our  international 
obligations must be safeguarded, particularly in  the GATT setting. 
s.  3- 1971  5 "I would  also  like  to  add that  neither  you  nor  we  wish  to  see  new 
barriers to trade arise in Europe, and we are convinced that both on our 
side  and on yours  no effort will  be  spared to  bring our discussions,  in 
the  framework  I  have  just  sketched  and  under  conditions  to  be  fixed 
later, to  a successful  and speedy conclusion. 
"We do not doubt that you want the same thing and that you also have 
ideas  concerning  how  you  might  best  contribute  to  the  building  of 
Europe.  We would,  therefore,  be pleased to  be  able  to  hear what you 
have to say on these matters.  I am convinced that our views  and yours 
will  serve  as  a  good starting point for  our discussions,  which  seem  to 
me to  be making a very  auspicious  beginning." 
4.  Owing  to  the  diversity  of  their  economic  and  politiCal  situations,  the 
States  concerned  put. forward,  at  the  ministerial  meetings  and  later  during 
exploratory  discussions,  rather  different ideas  as  to the  relations  they  would 
like  to  establish  with  the  enlarged  Community. 
(i)  Sweden 
As  it  rules  out  membership,  this  country  would  like  to  establish  the 
widest possible form of economic cooperation with the Community, extending 
also .to  the  latter's  future  development.  It  proposes  to  establish  a  customs 
union,  subject  to  a  non-harmonization  clause  concerning  commercial  policy, 
which  would however have ·;ery limited practical  effect. 
It is  prepared  to implement  the  common  agricultural  policy,  including 
its  financial  aspects. 
Sweden  also  intends  to  accept  the  principle  of  general  harmonization 
with the Community.  The Swedish delegation could,  however, give  no infor-
mation as  to how harmonization would work in  detail from  the institutional 
angle in the various sectors.  With regard to the way the principle of harmo-
nization  would  apply  to  future  measures  taken  by  the  Community,  Sweden 
would expect to be informed and consulted and possibly  to  be  represented  at 
preparatory meetings  before  final  decisions  are  reached. 
(ii)  Switzerland 
The Swiss  position  is  both pragmatic and very  detailed. 
Trade 
Switzerland rules  out any form  of harmonization;  in  view  of the facts, 
care must be  taken not to  overestimate the difficulties  arising from  deflection 
· of  trade  and  distortion  of  competition  caused  by  tariff  disparities  which 
can be eliminated by the application of rules  of origin. 
6  s.  3- 1971 Agriculture  .•. 
Switzerland has no wish to take part in the common agricultural policy .. 
It is  prepared  to  seek  ways  and  means  whereby  trade  may  be  facilitated. 
Great results  should  not be  expected  in  this  sector,  however,  in  view  of the 
dominant position the Community has  already  achieved  in  the Swiss  market. 
Distortion  of competition 
Switzerland  is  prepared  to  make  permanent  arrangements  to  avoid 
distortion.  These arrangements  should  not be  as· detailed  as  those  made by 
the  Community  but  should,  in  any  event,  settle  the  important  economic 
problems. 
Harmonization  of legislation,  transport,  and labour 
Switzerland is  very interested in the creation of Community law; it hopes 
to be able to solve problems of common interest together with the Community 
(insurance,  pharmaceutical products). 
In  the transport field,  Switzerland  wishes  to avoid  hindering  the work 
·carried out in  other quarters  (Central  Commission  for  the  navigation  of the 
Rhine,  ECSC-Switzerland  transport  agreements),  but  acknowledges  that  the 
agreement it has in mind might shed new light on these problems.  Switzerland 
is  very· reserved  on the subject of manpower. 
Development of the  Community 
In  view  of the fact  that its  economy is  closely  interconnected  with the 
Community's,  Switzerland  is  very  interested  in  cooperating in  economic  and 
monetary  matters,  as  well  as  in  industrial  policy,  technology,  environmental 
problems, etc.  It considers  that it will  be  necessary  to  make suitable institu-
tional  arrangements for  this  purpose. 
Institutional  problems 
Switzerland  attaches  great  importance  to  these  problems  and  realizes 
the difficulties.  It wishes  to  arrive at some form  of effective  say  in  decisions 
taken  corresponding to  the  commitments  it  is  prepared  to  enter  into. 
(iii)  Austria 
The  Austrian  position  1s  close  to  Switzerland's  as  far  as  the  general 
scope  of the  agreement  desired  is  concerned,  but Austria  sets  less  ambitious 
objectives  and  is  more  disposed  to  make  arrang_ements  similar  to  the  Com-
munity's. 
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Agriculture  , 
The  Austrian  aim  would  be  to  bring  about  a  certain  alignment  of 
agricultural policies gradually to ensure free movement of agricultural products. 
Partial  suspension  clause 
Only. Austria  of  the  neutral  countries  referred  to  this  problem,  which 
it had already raised during the 1965/67 negotiations. 
Institutional  problems 
Austria  laid less  stress  on this  question than Switzerland. 
(iv)  Einland 
The Finnish  approach  centres  mainly  on  trade  in  industrial  products, 
for  which it would like  a free  trade arrangement. 
Finland  attaches  great  importance  to  retaining  ex1stmg  economic  links 
with its  EFTA  partners,  safeguarding  cooperation  between  the  Nordic  coun-
tries,  and maintaining preferential trade arrangements  with the Soviet  Union, 
which, in Finland's opinion, should not lead  to distortion of trade  or compe-
tition,  just  as  these  arrangements  have  created  no such  distortion  under  the 
association  agreement  with  EFT  A. 
Unlike  Switzerland  and  Austria,  Finland  does  not  wish  to  participate 
in any way in  the Community's development. 
(v)  Iceland 
The Icelandic  delegation  stressed  the importance for  its  country  of  the 
export  of  fishery  products.  It  pointed  out  that,  in  its  opinion,  a  balanced 
agreement  would  be  achieved  if  the  Community  granted  concessions  to 
Iceland's fisheries  and if Iceland, in  return, granted the Community's industrial 
product~ facilities  along the lines  laid  down on its  accession  to EFT  A  (transi-
tional  period extending until  1980). 
In the case  of fishery  products,  Iceland  would  be  prepared  to  consider 
any  arrangements  (such  as  control  of  prices  and  quantities)  to  avoid  any 
disturbance  of  the  Community  market.  However,  social  and  ecological 
factors  formed  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  any  Icelandic  concessions  in  the 
matter of fishery rights. 
8  s.  3- 1971 (v) Portugal 
The Portuguese  delegation confirmed that the  agreement  desired  should 
go beyond a  mere trade arrangement and gradually permit transition towards 
closer  integration  of  the  Portuguese  economy  with  Europe's,  while  taking 
into  account  the  economic  development  of  the  country.  Article  238  was 
mentioned  as  ·a  possible  legal  basis.  The  agreement  would  cover  only 
Portugal's  European  territory. 
The Portuguese  delegation  stressed  the  vital  importance for  its  country 
of exports of tinned fish  and tomatoes, almonds, worked and unworked cork 
(all  these  products  being  regarded  as  "industrial  products"  in  EFTA),  wine 
and textile products.  It argued that, because of the weakness of its  industry, 
the Six  should grant Portugal  a  transitional  period exceeding that granted  to 
her in EFT  A (expiring in  1980), for a number of sectors. 
II 
5.  What is  common to all these positions is the wish to base these countries' 
relations  with  the  enlarged  Community  on  free  trade.  As  far  as  principles 
are concerned,  the Commission's  analysis  of  some· of  the  conditions  whereby 
free trade between the developed countries can be achieved has remained valid 
since the OEEC negotiations in  1958. 
In the first place, the elimination of the barriers to trade on a wide scale 
is  conceivable  only  if  competition  is  not appreciably  distorted  in  the case  of 
both  exports  and  imports  by  the  diversity  of  the  external  tariffs  and  trade 
policies of the countries concerned. 
In the second place, it is difficult to imagine customs barriers and quotas 
being  swept  away  completely  while  there  is  no  adequate  guarantee  that 
competition will not be  distorted by  rest"rictive agreements, dominant positions, 
dumping,  government  subsidies  or other practices. 
In  the third place,  it  will  be  impossible  to  remove  barriers  to  trade in 
the  case  of  some  products  if the liberalization  measures  are  not  sufficiently 
wide-ranging to ensure an  adequate balance between  benefits  and obligations. 
This  question  primarily  affects the problem  of  the  free  movement  of  goods, 
liberalization of services,  and wider trade in agricultural produce. 
Lastly,  it  is  unrealistic  to  contemplate  the  complete  elimination  ot 
customs barriers and quotas unless  economic policy is  coordinated to a degree 
which guarantees that the liberalization measures  achieved will  be  maintained. 
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contractual obligations.  As  is  stated in the Community Treaties, if they are to 
be  adhered to,  there must be  a permanent attempt, within  the framework  of 
common  institutions,  to  achieve  a  balance  between  these  various  interests. 
Moreover, it is  clear from  the experience gained since  the Treaties  came  into 
force that the rules laid down at the outset should be accompanied by  greater 
economic  solidarity,  if  the  balance  of  the  entire  edifice  is  not  to  be  upset; 
the  Council  resolution  of  8  and 9  February  1971  implementing  the  decision 
reached  at The Hague to  achieve  economic and monetary union  between  the 
Member States by stages met this requirement. 
6.  In theory, it would of  course be possible for  countries,  like  Sweden  for 
example,  having  the  same  economic  structure  as  the  Member  States· to  give 
definite undertakings to fulfil  the above-mentioned conditions in'  their relations 
with the Community,  and in  this  way to  achieve free  trade. 
However, an arrangement of this kind would encounter insuperable diffi-
culties, particularly from the institutional and administrative angle: 
(a)  In several spheres of the Community's activities, harmonization must lead 
to  an  identical  system.  This  is  so  in  the  agricultural  sector,  in  which 
free  trade  in  agricultural  produce  can  be  achieved  only  if  the 
agricultural  policy  measures  decided  upon  by  the  Community  are 
put into  effect  simultaneously  in  all  the  countries  concerned.  In  the 
same way, the rules governing competition laid down in  the Community 
Treaties  require  uniform  implementation  and,  consequently,  uniform 
case  law  resulting  from  the  decisions  reached  by  the  Commission  and 
the  Court  of  Justice,  and  thus  cannot  be  shared  with  non-member 
countries. 
(b)  A further problem concerns harmonization in relation to future decisions 
reached  by  the  Community.  Thus, while  the Swedish  delegation stated 
that it was  prepared to  consider  such  harmonization,  it  stipulated  that 
Sweden  should be  consulted  on these  decisions  and that, in  some cases, 
they  should  be  worked  out  in  contact  with  the  Swedish  authorities. 
Acceptance  of  this  requirement  would  involve  the  Community  in  very 
serious  complications.  Besides  Community decision-making  machinery, 
which  is  already  cumbersome  and  will  involve  a  greater  number  of 
Member  States  after  enlargement,  steps  would  have  to  be  taken  to 
make  arrangements for  consultation with the countries  concerned,  thus 
extending  still  further  the  periods  required  to  reach  decisions.  If the 
interests  of  these  countries  were  taken  into  account,  it  would  be  still 
more  difficult  to  achieve  the  many  agreements  which  are  required  if 
the Community is  to function properly.
1 
1  An  example  of such  a  risk  is  provided  by  the  discussions  with  Switzerland  concerning 
shipping  on  the Rhine. 
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powers in  order to keep  a  check on reciprocal  undertakings and to put 
them  into  effect,  there  can  be  no  guarantee  that  the  undertaking  to 
achieve harmonization given at the outset by all  the countries concerned 
can be maintained in all circumstances and outside the normal operation 
of  the  escape  clauses.  Such  countries  might  escape  from  these  under-
takings  either by  invoking the  reservations  concerning neutrality written 
into the agreements,  as  Sweden has  already requested, or because of the 
difficulty they  might encounter in  following the Community.  Detection 
of  failure  to  achieve  harmonization  and  correction  of  any  imbalance 
which might result, would involve the Community in extremely complex 
arrangements  both internally  and  within the  bodies  responsible  for  the 
administration  of  agreements. 
Thus,  we  are  faced  with the dilemma  summed  up  by  the  Commission 
in  its  Opinion  of  1  October  1969  (point  36,  second  paragraph),  in  the 
following  words: 
"On the  one hand, these  countries  might,  in  some  cases,  be  required 
to conform to decisions in which they  had played no part; on the other 
hand,  the  obligation  to  hold  consultations  and  the  ever-increasing 
number of special arrangements would involve inextricable complications 
for  the  Community." 
III 
7.  Ultimately,  agreements  with  non-member  countries  based  on the  Com-
munity's  concept  of  free  trade  presuppose  that  it  is  possible  to  purs'Ue . the 
following  aims  simultaneously: 
(a)  to arrive at uniform rules  of conduct applicable to both public author-
ities and transactors; 
(b)  to  preserve,  in  its  entirety,  the  Community's  independence  of  decision-
making and operation. 
Now,  these  aims  are  contradictory,  so  that one  can  be  achieved  only 
at the expense  of the  other. 
The statements,  quoted  earlier,  by  the  President  of  the  Council  leave 
no doubt  as  to  the  Community's  clear  determination  not to  get  invol~ed m 
arrangements which might  jeopardize the working of  its  institutions. 
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agreements  with  the  industrialized  countries,  rules  of  conduct  which  are 
similar, if  not identical, to those applied in the Community.  If such  rules  of 
conduct were not applied, these agreements would inevitably create a disparity 
as  compared  with  the  obligations  assumed  by  the  Member  States  of  the 
Community.  It would be  impossible to achieve that balance between benefits 
and obligations which naturally results from a total and unreserved commitment 
to  achieve  economic  union.  Moreover,  the  credibility  of  the  Community's 
cohesion  and  purpose  might  be  undermined  if economic  integration-which 
is  only  one  of  its  aims-were  achieved  by  measures  of  a  partial  nature, 
outside the framework of institutions endowed with their own powers. 
8.  In  the  memorandum  submitted  by  the  Commission  to  the  Council  in 
1959  on relations with other Western European States,  the Commission,  after 
drawing  attention  to  the  points  that  the  Community  had  had  to  take  into 
account  during  the  OEEC  negotiations,  expressed  the  view  that: 
"These points  of  concern  will  no doubt cease  to exist  when  the  Com-
munity is  in full  possession of its  powers; then it will  be in a position to take 
greater  risks.  What  is  difficult  to  achieve  today,  may  be  easier  to  achieve 
tomorrow." 
As  the Community's enlargement becomes imminent, and in view  of the 
progress  still  to  be  made  before  the  objectives  set  at  the  Hague  Conference 
are  achieved,  the  Commission  cannot  take  the  view  that  these  risks  have 
entirely  disappeared. 
Faced  with  this  problem,  the  Community must  make  a  choice  between 
two  attitudes: 
(a)  Either  it  takes  the  view  that  it  cannot  contemplate  the  removal  of 
barriers  to  trade  between  the  enlarged  Community  and  those  EFT  A 
Member States which, although they meet the requirements for member-
ship,  do not wish  to  join  for  reasons  of  their  own.  In this  event,  the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway would have to raise their tariffs 
vis-a-vis  their former  partners, 
(b)  or the Community agrees  that the main features  of the free  trade system 
achieved  by EFT  A should, in  principle,  be  retained and extended to the 
whole  of the enlarged  Community. 
Up  till  now,  the first  attitude has  been  ruled  out by  the  Council. 
A  temporary  solution  might  be  to  postpone  the  choice  until  a  date 
following  enlargement,  while  maintaining  the  status  quo  until  that  date  as 
regards  the  trade relations  created  by EFTA  in  the field  of  industrial  tariffs 
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the  Stockholm  Convention).  It  would  only  be  possible  to  maintain  the 
status quo for industrial tariffs,  since  the EFT  A agricultural  arrangements are 
incompatible with the common agricultural policy  and .  since EFT  A rules  and 
institutional provisions regarding competition and other matters cannot coexist 
with  the  new  Community  rules  with  which  the  new  member  countries  will 
have to comply. 
However, the longer the waiting period, the greater will b.e  the drawbacks 
which  result  from  the  fact  that  the  new  member  countries  belong  to  two 
preferential  areas  at .  the  same  time-the  Community's  and  EFT  A's.  The 
status  quo period should therefore be limited to two years, for  example,  after 
their  accession,  for  during  this  period  tariff  reductions  between  the Six  and 
the new Member States  will  not have been  large  enough for  there  to  be  any 
fear  of serious  distortions. 
The advantage of this  solution would  be  that it would  not commit the 
Community  to  a  particular  course  of  action,  for  it  would  leave  it  time  to 
obtain a clearer picture of the way its external relations were developing, partic-
ularly with a view  to a possible round of international negotiations  on tariffs 
and  trade. 
The  advantage  of  this  approach,  which  would  reserve  the  posltlon  to 
be adopted by the enlarged Community and would nevertheless involve taking 
various essential technical precautions, would be  that it could be  applied very 
rapidly.  However, the question might arise whether it would be in  conformity 
with the Council's wish that the agreements  with the non-applicant  countries 
should  come  into  force  concurrently  with  the  accession  of  the  applicant 
countries. 
9.  If the  Council insisted  on  this  point,  it  would  be  necessary  to  consider 
an  arrangement  involving  the  abolition  of  customs  duties  and  quantitative 
restrictions  for  industrial  products,  to  the  exclusion  of  any  contractual  obli-
gation to achieve  harmonization. 
The  abolition  of  customs  duties  already  achieved  within  EFT  A  as 
regards  industrial products would be maintained  and extended,  by  means  of 
a transitional period, to relations between the original members of the enlarged 
Community  and  those EFT  A  countries  not applying for  membership.  Thus, 
a  basic  system  would  be  established  reflecting  the  new  relationship  with 
EFTA,  three Member States  of which  will  belong to  the Community.  If the 
solution  is  confined  to  this  aspect  of  the  problem,  any  danger  of  setting 
precedents as  regards relations with non-member countries would be ruled out. 
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enlarged Community and each of the countries concerned.  These agreements 
would have to include special provisions in  some sectors  to allow for  specific 
situations,  for  example  special  provisions  for  ECSC  products,. and  arrange-
ments  for  some  agricultural  and fishery  products  in  order  to  lend  economic 
significance  to  the  agreements  with  Iceland  and ·Portugal. 
The  provisions  covering  trade  would  not  be  accompanied  by  any 
commitment  to  achieve  harmonization,  but  by  escape  clauses  which  would 
enable the Community to restore the balance if  disparities in conduct affected 
the Community's industries  adversely.  It is  essential  that such escape  clauses 
should  be  invoked  by  the  Community  only  and not by  the  Member States; 
otherwise, a uniform import policy would rapidly become impossible. 
On political and economic grounds it is  desirable that this system should 
be  accompanied  by  the  conclusion  of  separate  agreements  in  order  to  settle 
with some of these countries such questions as the fair treatment of Community 
workers and cooperation in transport matters. 
The distinction  between  agreements  establishing free  trade in  industrial 
products and the other problems just referred to clearly shows the Community's 
determination  to  remain  entirely  free  to  lay  down  and  implement  its  own 
policies,  which are essential to strengthen the Community. 
The joint body  to be set up  to  administer  these  agreements  should  be 
given  powers  of  decision  only  ia  technical  matters  arising  from  the  trade 
arrangements  covered  by  the  agreements. 
Furthermore, it is  impossible to be sure at the outset that the provisions 
contained in such agreements will prove entirely suitable, for this  system might 
not  completely  remove  all  possibility  of  distortion.  It  is  also  difficult  to 
foresee  what the  result  would  be  if  reciprocal  escape  clauses  were  invoked. 
Hence it would be logical  not to give  a  definitive  character to  the provisions 
contained  in  the  agreements  with  the  non-applicant  countries.  It  might  be 
possible for instance to arrange a meeting at the end of the transitional period 
in  order  to  review  the  situation  and,  on  the  basis  of  experience  gained,  to 
arrive  at  the  most  satisfactory  form  of  subsequent  relations  between  the 
countries  concerned  and the  Community. 
It should  be  possible  to  withdraw from  the  agreements  subject  to  one 
year's notice,  as  in  EFTA. 
10.  If it is  not decided  to  retain  the status  quo  for  a  two-year  period  the 
Commission feels  that it should suggest to the Council that simple agreements 
based on a few general, easily applicable rules relating mainly to trade in indus-
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only of the Community, but of all  the countries  concerned,  and would at the 
same  time  conform  with  GATT  rules. 
By  agreeing  to  reach  agreements  based  on  the  abolition  of  barriers  to 
trade in  industrial products with non-applicant EFT  A countries,  the  enlarged 
Community  would  in  the  first  instance  take  into  account  the  substantial 
economic interests of both its new members and neighbouring countries linked 
with all  its  members by  all kinds  of  ties.  The Community would thus  avoid 
the considerable complications which would inevitably arise if an attempt were 
made to  seek  differentiated,  and therefore  delicate,  solutions  to  the  problems 
raised  by  the  existence  at  the  present  time  of  different  tariff  arrangements 
vis-a-vis  these  countries. 
In  the  second  place,  this  type  of  agreement  would  best  preserve  the 
Community's  autonomy  by  keeping  institutionalized  economic  integration 
distinct  from  relations  of  an  essentially  commercial  nature.  The  situation 
vis-a-vis  other non-member countries would remain clear:  there would be  no 
question  of  granting  some  countries  advantages  inherent  in  participation  in 
European  integration  without  their  joining  the  Community,  but  of  solving 
specific  trade  problems  arising from  the fact  that three EFT  A Member States 
would  leave  that organization  to  join  the  Community. 
In the last analysis, the vital distinction from now on in relations between 
Western European countries would seem to consist in the range of links binding 
them in economic matters and the extent to which these links  are irreversible. 
What  the  Community  has  already  done,  the  objectives  it has  set  itself  and, 
. above  all,  the  part played  by  the common institutions  in  its  functioning,  all 
guarantee the irreversible  nature of  the  Community's  achievements  and of  its 
future  development. 
By  contrast, one feature of such  agreements with non-applicant countries 
would  be  their  more  limited  scope,  and  another  a  certain  precariousness 
inherent  in  their  very  nature,  on  account  for  example  of  the  escape  and 
withdrawal clauses  which will  have to be  embodied in these  agreements. 
In  order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be stressed that there 
is  nothi_ng  to  prevent  these  countries  aligning  themselves  independently  on 
Community rules.  Clearly,  the fewer  the  divergences  between  the respective 
sets  of  rules,  the less -likelihood  there  is  of  the  escape  clauses  being  invoked 
and the greater  the  stability  in  trade  relations  with  the  Community.  While 
alignment  of  this  type  would  ensure  that  the  proposed  trade  arrangements 
worked smoothly,  it  would  not  change  the nature of established  contractual 
bonds.  It will  be  up  to the Community's  partners  to  decide  freely  whether 
they wish to follow  this  path in  order to reduce the precarious aspects  of the 
agreements or whether they prefer, as  more than one has  considered essential, 
to retain complete independence, for example, in  tariff matters or trade policy. 
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